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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON LEGAL FEES
by
Harold Brown*
A LTHOUGH the economics of law practice are now more generously
being discussed, for the most part such analyses are directed to the
fact that the ordinary lawyer has 1,300 productive hours annually and
that a minimum hourly rate of twenty-five dollars is not likely to produce
a net income comparable to that in other professions. Aside from rising
costs for rent, secretaries, telephones, and supplies, neophytes from leading
law schools are being offered $18,000 yearly salaries by Wall Street firms,
and are counter-demanding twenty per cent release time for social law
practice, and a sabbatical year's leave of absence All of these factors
point in the direction of increasing legal fees. However, according to the
inflammatory message of Murray T. Bloom's book, The Trouble With
Lawyers,' tort lawyers annually collect far in excess of $1 billion in con-
tingent fees, and probate specialists obtain hundreds of millions, often
with little effort or risk. Although Mr. Bloom indulges in indictment by
statistics and guilt by association, obviously there is much merit in his
decrying of certain abuses, and his work would seem to presage a flood
of criticism. Perhaps such painful attacks may serve a useful purpose if
they evoke frank and open discussion of the real problems that confront
attorneys in designing effective procedures for establishing both the proper
amount of fees and security for their collection.
I. THE PROPER FEE
It is, of course, established law that fair and reasonable compensation
for an attorney should not be limited solely to the number of hours of
work, but that "many considerations are pertinent, including the ability
and reputation of the attorney, the demand for his services by others, the
amount and importance of the matter involved, the time spent, the prices
usually charged for similar services by other attorneys in the same neigh-
borhood, the amount of money or the value of the property affected by
controversy, and the results secured."' Transmuting such standards to
* B.A., Yale University; LL.B., LL.M., Harvard University. Attorney at Law, Boston, Massa-
chusetts.
' The revolutionary concept of a sabbatical year has much to commend itself both to profes-
sionals and business executives. Aside from the captious allure of a free year every seventh year,
while one is young enough to enjoy it, the vistas unlocked by such an opportunity are literally
endless, whether it be a year of study, teaching, writing for professional or other purposes; donation
of effort to governmental, legislative, or charitable causes; tasting of other geographic areas, or
even "sailing around Good Hope." The spill-over of such projects into the six "barren" years should
provide the impetus for substantial rut-ridding. The economics of such a program are readily
available in any group practice, provided plans are made well in advance and strictly adhered to.
In its immediate impact, partners would be less possessive of selected clients, thus encouraging
younger men to assume responsibility often denied them for years. With a determined effort, even
single practitioners could loosely associate for implementation of such a program as well as for
mutual aid in covering for annual vacation and sickness plans.
' M. BLOOM, THE TROUBLE wiTH LAWYERS (1968).
'Cummings v. National Shawmut Bank, 284 Mass. 563, 569, 188 N.E. 489, 492 (1933); see
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a dollar figure has been subject to such wide variations that bar associa-
tions have attempted to establish minimum fees for the guidance of at-
torneys and as information for clients. Such minimum fee schedules have
become increasingly prevalent not only on a statewide basis, but also in
various specialized associations, such as the Commercial Law League and
the Conveyancers Association.4 Aside from the use of persuasion to see
that attorneys adhere to such schedules, in states having a unified bar it
is possible that violations could be subject to stronger penalties.5
It is rather astonishing that the bar has failed to recognize that such
minimum fee schedules constitute minimum price fixing and are in direct
violation of federal antitrust laws.' Subscribing to such schedules operates
as an express "contract, combination, or conspiracy" in restraint of trade.'
In situations in which attorneys are subject to reprimand or censure if
they charge less than the prescribed fees, the violation seems even clearer.
While some legal matters might not come within the purview of the
federal antitrust laws because they do not affect interstate commerce, they
would nevertheless be subject to state antitrust laws in those jurisdictions
which have adopted the federal antitrust laws directly or through a so-
called "Baby" Federal Trade Commission Act.!
Except in major law offices, the hourly charge is hardly standard
practice. In most instances, the attorney will arbitrarily select a fee,
often without any sound foundation and frequently without reference
to that most exacting factor of all, the time spent on the case. Even more
damaging is the prevailing custom of paying a referral fee to another law
firm.' If such a referral fee be one-third, counsel would be left with a
net fee of approximately twenty-seven per cent of the gross charge to the
Angoff v. Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185 (1st Cir. 1959); Elbaum v. Sullivan, 344 Mass. 662, 183 N.E.2d
712 (1962); Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 18 (1957).
4 Generally, for commercial accounts, the minimum fee is 15% on the first $1,000, and 10%
on the excess.5 See Walker Estate, 26 Pa. D. & C.2d 315, 320 (Orphans' Ct. 1962), where the court stated:
"In our opinion, a presumption arises when counsel fees are requested in accordance with the sug-
gestions contained in a Minimum Fee schedule adopted by the bar association of the locality, that
such fees are fair and equitable and the burden of establishing that such fees are excessive rests
upon the person who is objecting thereto."
eSee United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911). The proscription of a "clearly excessive fee" in
the ABA CoDE oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-106(A), at 9 (Final Draft, July 1969),
would appear equally offensive to the antitrust prohibition of maximum price maintenance. Al-
brecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
7Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964); cf. United States v. Prince George's
County Bd. of Realtors, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REI'. (1969 Trade Cas.) 5 45,069, at 52,740 (D.
Md., Dec. 18, 1969) (institution of governmental injunction suit against real estate brokers' asso-
ciation and members, where latter agreed not to accept listing of property except at recommended
commission rates); United States v. Cleveland Real Estate Bd., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1970 Trade
Cas.) 45,070, at 52,774. (D. Ohio, July 29, 1970) (suit alleging similar conspiracy in violation
of the Sherman Antitrust Act); A Thorn in the Fee Schedule Field, 10 LAW OFFicE ECON. &
MGM'T 310 (1970).8 See,. e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, §§ 1-10 (1967).
' The American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility, which was adopted in
1969 and became effective on January 1, 1970, effectively prohibits the paying of a referral fee
to another lawyer. ABA CoD oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-107, at 25 (Final Draft,
July 1969). However, the Code of Professional Responsibility is not effective for disciplinary pur-
poses in most states until affirmative action is taken to adopt the Code by the appropriate state
authorities. See Sutton, The American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility: An
Introduction, 48 TExAs L. REv. 255, 256 (1970).
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client, after deduction of, for example, a forty per cent overhead factor.
For most litigated cases, both by custom and by seeming necessity, the
contingent fee has come to prevail. Although frowned upon in many
states and even outlawed in Canada and England, such fees have long been
recognized under the Canons of the American Bar Association as long as
they are subject to judicial supervision. 0 Such approval does not neces-
sarily mean that contingent fees are proper, that they are not subject to
abuse, nor that sufficient judicial procedures exist to supervise their use.
Even in minority stockholders' class actions, where the law itself provides
that the fee for plaintiff's counsel is contingent upon recovery and is to
be set by the court, the arrangement has been the subject of some judicial
intransigence." And only recently have such states as Massachusetts form-
ally recognized their legitimacy by rules of court." Although the Mas-
sachusetts rule requires a written agreement and provides for judicial
review, no fee schedules are prescribed. However, even the prescription
of a percentage schedule would not necessarily provide effective control
over the percentages which are appropriate in particular categories of
cases.
Under some federal statutes, specific fees are prescribed. For example,
for property seizure claims arising from World War II, a specific fee of
ten per cent is prescribed.'" Contingent fees are severely restricted in in-
come tax cases,' " and in tort claims against the United States." In anti-
trust proceedings, where fees are to be assessed against a defendant, the
courts have imposed a maximum of fifty per cent of single damages, and
the national average is said to be in the range of twenty to twenty-five
per cent of such single damages." A similar pattern has evolved in the
minority stockholders' class action. In most of these cases, however, re-
covery has been quite substantial so that such comparatively moderate
percentage allowances have in fact been generous in amount.
Perhaps the most significant complaint of clients emanates from the
growing prevalence of fifty per cent contingent fees for automobile torts
and similar personal injury claims. In many states, such excessive per-
centages are further aggravated by being applied to the gross recovery,
rather than after deduction of out-of-pocket legal costs. Where there have
been substantial expenses for depositions or appeals, a fifty per cent con-
tingent fee based on the gross recovery may leave the client with forty
to forty-five per cent of the gross recovery. Although such a result would
10 ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 13. Under the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility, contingent fee arrangements are authorized in civil cases, except "a lawyer generally should
decline to accept employment on a contingent fee basis by one who is able to pay a reasonable
fee .... " ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 2-20, at 18 (Final Draft, July 1969).
"See Angoff v. Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185, 192 (1st Cir. 1959).
12MASS. Sup. Jun. CT. R. 3:14.
50 U.S.C. § 20 (1964).
'4 Unconscionable fees are prohibited under U.S. Treasury regulations. 31 C.F.R. I 10.28 (1970).
'528 U.S.C. § 2678 (1964) provides a maximum fee of 10% for amounts up to $2,500, and
a maximum fee of 20% in certain other cases.
6 See Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 190 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1951); Webster Motor
Car Co. v. Packard Motor Car Co., 166 F. Supp. 865 (D.D.C. 1955), cross-appeal dismissed, 243
F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957).
1970]
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appear incongruous, agreements for thirty-three per cent for personal
injury claims and twenty-five per cent for property damage claims have
usually been found acceptable. Oddly enough, the almost standard fee of
ten per cent charged for property damage claims under fire insurance
policies has met with little resistance, even though the elements of risk
for both recovery and coverage are usually minimal. Under all contingent
fee arrangements, the courts have prescribed that legal costs must be borne
by the client," a requirement that has unfortunately been almost com-
pletely ignored in practice, except where recovery has been accomplished.
The advent of oral discovery in many state courts has, however, created
a financial necessity that the hundreds of dollars involved in such proce-
dure be provided for, preferably in advance. And rapidly rising overhead
costs have led to a growing trend of requiring a minimum cash retainer,
often in consideration of a lesser percentage in case of recovery.
Although much criticism has been heaped on attorneys because of the
contingent fee, little attention has been directed to the plight of counsel
who has accepted a claim on a purely contingent basis, waits three to five
years for trial, then finds himself dismissed by an impatient client just
when trial is imminent. More exasperating is the case in which the at-
torney negotiates a good settlement, then finds his client adamant or
even engaged in some ruse to circumvent the lawyer's fee by entering
into direct negotiations or engaging a new attorney. One method of guard-
ing against such abuse by the client is to prescribe in the contingent fee
agreement that the fee shall be considered earned if a fair and reasonable
offer has been obtained for the client. Another alternative is to make
generous provision for a specific fee or for compensation at a prescribed
hourly rate if the client declines to accept such an offer or unjustifiably
dismisses the attorney.
Although the contingent fee arrangement has been forced on attorneys
because of the financial inability of numerous classes of clients to pay on a
standard hourly or daily rate basis, it inherently involves social and psy-
chological problems. The client who loses his case is delighted to avoid
the need for paying counsel. The client who wins obviously feels that
he is bearing the burden for others whose cases were lost. After the vic-
tory, the client also becomes convinced that the risks of obtaining a ver-
dict and collecting the judgment were in fact minimal. Technical niceties
aside, the attorney does have a direct interest in the litigation with the risk
of preference of self and overtones of champerty and maintenance.
The difficulty in prescribing the appropriate percentage fee is almost
insurmountable, depending as it does on the numerous variables in win-
ning the case and obtaining collection. Supervision of the prescription of
percentages, often a matter of hindsight, offers further complications. But
if the courtroom doors are to be kept open to those of middle or modest
means, the only alternative to the contingent fee is some form of socialized
practice, be it sponsored by private or public funds. A whole variety of
"See, e.g., MASS. Sup. JuD. Cr. R. 3:14(5) (f).
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risks, including cost of counsel, is now covered by private insurance, and
there is an incipient movement to provide miscellaneous private legal serv-
ices through salaried attorneys in such groups as labor unions.18
Aside from contingent fees, the area most subject to abuse and appar-
ently the most difficult to control lies in the field of probate. In almost
all jurisdictions, statutes, rules of court, or deeply imbedded custom, call
for percentage fees based on the size of the estate. Even fees of three to
six per cent can become grotesque when applied to substantial estates
where compensation may grossly exceed the amount of effort involved,
particularly where the assurance of both result and payment is complete."
Adding to such abuse the nepotism in appointment by judges and the
gross allowances often made for perfunctory services of appraisers and
guardians ad litem, it is not surprising that a whole segment of the judicial
system has been excoriated. In this area, the active participation of the
probate judge, whose actions in this field are for all practical purposes
beyond review, geometrically compounds all efforts to reach a solution.
II. COLLECTION, SECURITY, AND FEE PROCEDURES
Although frustrations attendant in obtaining clients, securing a meri-
torious case, and collecting a judgment are the normal expectancies of
practice, these are exacerbated when the lawyer cannot collect his fee
without further litigation. Security for that fee is even harder to come
by, since the common law and statutory liens are ill-defined, strictly con-
strued, and generally addressed only to narrow situations. Yet without the
sustenance of collecting his fee, the lawyer can hardly function efficiently
or pay his own bills.
Even when the amount of the fee is undisputed, lawyers are notoriously
lax in the extension of credit for their services. Few businesses could
survive without reliance on credit reporting procedures, as well as de-
liberate attention to the aging of accounts receivable and strict collection
practices. Yet most attorneys will seldom use such procedures, will wait
endlessly to collect, and would hardly dream of charging interest on
delinquent payments. Instead of adopting proven business practices, most
attorneys will resort to simple protective devices, such as collection of the
fee in advance (by installments if necessary) or provision that payment
of settlements or judgments be made by check payable to the order of
the attorney or jointly to the attorney and his client, the latter procedure
being somewhat standard where an insurance company is the source of
payment. An infrequent procedure is to require the client to execute a
promissory note and pledge some form of collateral as security.
Lawyers are nevertheless victimized by grossly negligent extension of
credit for valid services rendered and the complicated task of providing
1UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); cf. ABA ConE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-103 (D) (5), at 8 (Final Draft, July 1969).
"9 Cf. Rauch Estate, 44 Pa. D. & C.2d 674, 677 (Orphans' Ct. 1968) (giving "considerable




security for the collection of fees. Except in aggravated cases, most attor-
neys are reluctant to sue for their fees.2" Some practitioners boast that
they have never sued a client. If such be the case, they must have for-
feited or compromised their invoices or consistently undercharged. In the
normal course of events, it necessarily follows that some clients will dis-
pute fee charges, unduly delay payment, or bluntly take advantage of
the known reluctance of attorneys to pursue such claims by litigation.
With fifty per cent of all litigants usually losing their cases, resentment
can easily breed recalcitrance in paying the attorney an agreed fee. If the
amount of a fee be disputed by the client or the attorney, or if the at-
torney cannot obtain voluntary payment by the client, it is a source of
much distress to resort to standard litigation procedures to settle the dis-
pute. Many attorneys are loathe to interfere in such fee matters between
a client and his erstwhile attorney. Wholly aside from the discomforts of
further litigation and its attendant expense, such reluctance is often a
substantial obstacle to an aggrieved client because of the difficulty in
obtaining a new attorney to handle the fee case. As for the aggrieved
attorney, although the direct expense of such secondary litigation may
be more moderate, he is confronted with the loss of valuable time as well
as the risk of a tarnished reputation in the community, particularly if
such litigation is of substantial frequency.
Quite recently it has been suggested that attorneys could obtain the ad-
vantages of supervised credit reporting, collection of fees, and the trans-
position of interest for credit extension by utilizing third-party banking
facilities."5 The format for such arrangements falls within the well-
established use of credit card facilities operated by banks or similar institu-
tions. Stated inversely, clients seeking legal services on credit would be
offered the use of such credit card systems under which the attorney might
pay a modest percentage for the discounting service and the client would
then make his installment payment to the lending institution at published
interest rates. Certainly the advantages of such charge account systems
are well established in the American economy.
It is difficult to see why legal services should not be purchased in the
same manner as a television set or an automobile. By spreading payments
over a period of time acceptable both to the client and the lending institu-
tion, the impact of substantial legal fees could be moderated not only for
those with middle income, but more probably even for those with modest
income. As for the attorney, the advantage of cash payment at a moderate
discount would be economically sound and would free him from time-
consuming collection functions directed toward his own clients. By elimi-
1 
. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 38 permits lawyers to sue clients for fes to
prevent injustice, fraud, or imposition by the client. The new Code of Professional Responsibility
discourages such suits "unless necessary to prevent fraud or gross imposition by the client." ABA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBrLITY, EC 2-23, at 17 (Final Draft, July 1969) (emphasis
added).
1 The ABA Committee on Professional Ethics has ruled that such a payment method would
be unethical. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 1120 (1969). However,
the use by lawyers of the special version of BankAmericard has been approved by the Oregon
State Bar Association. OREGON STATE BAR BULLETIN, Feb. 1970, at 11.
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nating the risk of non-payment, the attorney need not attribute bad-
debt expenses to the fees charged to paying clients. Of greatest importance,
such a system would open the doors of the law office to those large seg-
ments of the public which have been forced to forego the benefits of legal
services except in matters of extreme distress. In spite of the obvious need
for competent legal services for numerous problems in today's sophisti-
cated society, great segments of the population have come to attorneys
only in case of criminal charges or possibly to handle a tort claim or the
transfer of real property. In the medical profession, the need to make its
services available to the major portion of the population has been met in
part through advance payment programs and more recently through medi-
cal charge-account plans operated by banks or special credit entities.
Aside from the collection of fees, matters of security can be difficult
both for clients and attorneys. As pointed out in The Trouble With Law-
yers,' the legal profession is one of the few remaining businesses in which
those who are entrusted with substantial funds of others are not required
to be bonded. Attorneys not only handle clients' funds in transit, but
often hold substantial funds in escrow arrangements or as trustees for
estates. While ethical standards require that such trust funds be handled
with extreme care and not even be commingled with the attorney's own
funds, the fact remains that neither the threat of punishment, nor the
procedures for enforcing it, will provide restitution for the client whose
funds have been misappropriated by counsel.
Several remedies have been tried and suggested. One such alternative
would require all attorneys in a particular jurisdiction to make periodic
contributions of fixed amounts to a clients' security fund administered by
the local bar association. Such self-insurance plans have three obvious
shortcomings. First, they seldom provide truly adequate funds to cover
the embezzlement of large sums. The administration of such a plan may
prove ineffective because of insufficient publicity. And the determination
of claims can be both time-consuming and embarrassing to the very legal
profession whose own funds are being used to pay amounts found to have
been mishandled. Another system involves the actual auditing of all at-
torney's accounts. Such procedure is standard practice in England and has
been tried in the United States. In Toronto, such auditing has been estab-
lished on a so-called "blitz" basis, with auditors making unannounced spot
investigations. Although such audit systems might be effective, on a na-
tionwide basis, they would prove extremely expensive, cumbersome, and
subject to wide opposition." Compared with either of such plans, the
simplest solution would involve bonding of attorneys. If it be thought
that compulsory bonding would be too drastic and possibly expensive,
an alternative would be to make bonding voluntary and to allow represen-
tation of that fact to be stated on legal stationery. With such notice, clients
22M. BLOOM, supra note 2, at 48-49.
" The ABA Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement has recommended
that records pertaining to clients' funds and property be audited annually by a certified public
accountant. ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, FIRST
REPORT, Recommendation XXXII (Jan. 1970); see M. BLOOM, supra note 2, at 33-47.
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could make a knowledgeable choice as to whether their funds should be
entrusted to a bonded or unbonded attorney. The real advantages of
bonding would lie in the complete protection afforded, as well as its
independent administration.
If clients have cause for complaint, so do attorneys. Perhaps to dis-
courage resort to suit for the collection of fees, most jurisdictions provide
some kind of lien to protect legal fees. In some states, as in Massachusetts,
the courts have denied the existence of a common law lien on the proceeds
of litigation,"4 and have limited the statutory lien to instances in which
litigation was actually instituted in the client's behalf.' The compara-
tively recent allowance of contingent fee agreements by rule 3:4 of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court"' raises the interesting question as
to whether such an agreement creates an equitable lien on the proceeds of
the case, regardless of whether suit was instituted." Although many states
acknowledge a common law lien, this attaches only to actual judgment
and is often limited to costs." Where the common law lien covers the
fee as well, it is regarded as an equitable assignment of an actual judg-
ment subject to review to prevent overreaching, and binding on the prin-
cipal defendant only after notice."'
Perhaps the most basic existing protection is the attorney's lien on his
clients' papers so long as they are in the attorney's possession." Unfortu-
nately, such a lien usually means merely that the client cannot obtain from
his erstwhile attorney evidence which may be essential for the assertion
of rights. Such a possessory lien, of eighteenth century origin, is regarded
as security for all debts to the attorney, regardless of the amount due
in the particular matter for which possession may have been obtained, and
the lien will even preclude the client's right to inspect the documents."1
If the papers are summoned for use in trial by the former client, and if
the parties consent, the court may determine the appropriate fee in sum-
mary proceedings and, after payment, require production." If such papers
contain documents of inherent value, such as a promissory note, stock
'4Elbaum v. Sullivan, 344 Mass. 662, 183 N.E.2d 712 (1962); Check v. Kaplan, 280 Mass.
170, 182 N.E. 305 (1932).
"Elbaum v. Sullivan, 344 Mass. 662, 183 N.E.2d 712 (1962).
26 See note 12 supra, and accompanying text.
'See Delval v. Gagnon, 213 Mass. 203, 99 N.E. 1095 (1912); Coram v. Davis, 209 Mass. 229,
95 N.E. 298 (1911); Black, Attorneys Liens in Massachusetts, 24 B.U.L. REV. 224 (1944).
28See, e.g., Tyler v. Rhode Island Super. Ct., 30 RI. 107, 73 A. 467 (1909).
"Everett v. Alpha Portland Cement Co., 225 F. 931 (2d Cir. 1915); In re Stronge & Warner
Millinery Co., 33 F.2d 1001 (D. Minn. 1929); Norrell v. Chasan, 125 N.J. Eq. 230, 4 A.2d 88
(Ct. Err. & App. 1939); Prichard v. Fulmer, 22 N.M. 134, 159 2. 39 (1916); Roxana Petroleum
Co. v. Rice, 109 Okla. 161, 235 P. 502 (1935); Weed Sewing Mach. Co. v. Boutelle, 56 Vt. 570
(1884).
"Cobb v. Tirrell, 141 Mass. 459, 5 N.E. 828 (1886); Reynolds v. Warner, 128 Neb. 304,
258 N.W. 462 (1935); Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Rinaolo, 108 N.J. Eq. 167, 154 A. 528(Sup. Ct. 1931); In re Cooper, 291 N.Y. 255, 52 N.E.2d 421 (1943); Burns v. Pratt, 167 Okla.
546, 31 P.2d 106 (1934); cf. Torphy v. Reder, 257 N.E.2d 435 (Mass. 1970) (lien on client's
funds undecided).
"Bulk Oil Transports v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 277 F. 25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
257 U.S. 657 (1921). See generally 111 A.L.R. 487 (1943).
327 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 233 (1937).
" Davis v. Davis, 90 F. 791 (C.C.D. Mass. 1898).
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certificate,u or savings bank book,' the attorney may have a lien of sub-
stantial value, since it has been held that the former client cannot defeat
the lien by requiring production in response to a subpoena duces tecum.
Unfortunately, however, the possessory lien has been generally regarded
as a "passive lien and cannot ordinarily be actively enforced either at law
or in equity. '"'s Although not universally followed, the general rule would
appear to allow a court to order the delivery of the client's papers either
upon payment or on substitution of security in a sufficient sum to cover
the attorney's demand, particularly where allowing retention would un-
duly delay the former client's litigation."
III. CONCLUSION
These problems would seem to indicate the need for prompt, efficient,
impartial, and inexpensive procedures to handle fee disputes between at-
torneys and their clients. Neither established court procedures nor bar
association intervention provides an answer to all of these requirements,
although the voluntary submission of such disputes to binding arbitration
could suffice. Perhaps such voluntary submissions could be encouraged by
the adoption of bar association rules, procedure, lists of arbitrators (not
necessarily all lawyers), and discreet publicity as to their availability. In all
probability, the bar association could appropriately exact an undertaking
by all of its members to subscribe to the use of such procedures.
At least one solution has the benefit of successful application, patterned
on the procedure employed in Ontario. All disputed legal fees are there
handled through summary process before a court-appointed assessing
officer with authority comparable to that of a U.S. Referee in Bankruptcy.
A petition may be filed either by the attorney or the client, based on a
simple presentation of the issues involved. Hearings are held within a
few days and somewhat informally, with a rarely used right of appeal on
questions of law. The determination is legally binding, with judgment and
execution to issue. The very availability of such impartial, inexpensive,
and speedy justice, tends to eliminate the need for resorting to it. In
most cases, the assessing officer can amicably mediate the dispute.
While it would be foolhardy for a single attorney to prescribe solutions
to these many fee questions, it is equally ridiculous for any attorney to
believe that the problems can be swept under the carpet. It is rather
mandatory that prompt measures be taken not only to maintain the
dignity of each attorney, but to restore that confidence in counsel which
is the cornerstone of the administration of justice.
" Smyth v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 326 Pa. 391, 192 A. 640 (1937).
86n re Cooper, 291 N.Y. 255, 52 N.E.2d 421 (1943).
" Id.
reMorse v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 65 Nev. 275, 195 P.2d 199 (1948); Robinson v. Rogers,
237 N.Y. 467, 143 N.E. 647 (1924).
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